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INTERDEPARTMENTAL "JIGSAW" COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting  
Held in Room 117, Central Building  
On 31 January 1950 at 1430

Mr. Theodore Babbitt, Presiding

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PRESENT

Mr. Bernard Morris.....Department of State  
Mr. Louis Nemzer.....Department of State  
Major Ralph E. Boynton.....Department of the Army  
Mr. W. Abbott.....Department of the Navy  
Lt. Col. Hershel Williams.....Department of the Air Force  
Mr. Cartha D. De Loach.....Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Mr. Lish Mitson.....Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Captain Henry P. Wright, Jr., USN.....Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Army, FBI, JCS, Navy, USAF  
and State Department  
review(s) completed.

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL "JIGSAW" COMMITTEEMinutes of Meeting

BABBITT: In opening the meeting, I am impelled to start out by the old expression, 'long time no see.' It has been a very long time since this committee last met. The reasons for that are many and varied. They stem from the complicated, and even controversial job of the Sub-Committee which was appointed at that last meeting, and also the very difficult job of the Secretary in making and endeavoring to get in order the results of the canvass of the agencies which was also ordered by this committee at the last meeting.

In line with that, I think the best way to proceed, before considering the report of the Sub-Committee, would be to ask the Secretary to report on the results of the canvass of the agencies for their production of papers on International Communism.

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[ ] When the Committee decided to have the Secretary undertake a survey of completed and planned intelligence projects on Communism, a suitable form for a questionnaire was developed, approved by the Chairman and sent out to the members of the Committee. The survey was to be agency-wide; external research projects were also to be taken into consideration.

The Interim JIGSAW Committee had concluded its own canvass by July 1948. Therefore, it was decided that the new survey should begin 1 August 1948, and, for the purpose of this particular canvass, end on 1 September 1949. Reference was made to the fact that this canvass should be the beginning of a new project card file to be made available to the Committee; therefore it was requested that the agencies continue to submit monthly reports on Communism projects planned, prepared, or completed. To date, this request has been largely ignored.

The total number of cards received is 179. Of these, 9 are Top Secret and are not quoted. Top Secret projects were eliminated and so were a few titles which did not seem pertinent to the particular interests of the JIGSAW Committee. A number of other titles have been mentioned under several headings in the table of titles. There are 25 external research projects. In

order to give the Committee an over-all concept of the type of projects reported on the questionnaires, a table of titles has been prepared and is available to the members of the Committee.

The majority of the questionnaires were returned to the Secretary's office by the latter part of October; the remainder arrived in mid-November. It was noted, however, that in a number of cases, no description of the project had been given and that most descriptions were not adequate to permit a near-correct assessment of the documents in question. The Secretary did not request all the completed papers for purposes of conducting a scientific analysis. Such analysis would have meant the study of 179 documents. Consequently, the Secretary could only draw certain conclusions from the partially completed questionnaires and such inferences must, of necessity, remain superficial.

In addition to the comparative inconclusiveness as to the value of US Government projects, there was also little information available on external research projects. At the time of the survey, only a few projects came to the attention of the Secretary and those had not been completed. This is also true of the projects of the semi-governmental Rand Corporation which has since completed a number of studies.

It would, of course, be possible to conduct a scientific survey of intelligence production on Communism if there were at the Committee's disposal a group of analysts who, for an extensive period, would devote their entire time to the study of available documents and then evaluate them in relation to the JIGSAW program. Since the Secretary cannot assume that he would have the means to carry out such a project at this time, he suggests that research in and systematic analysis of available intelligence be limited to those topics which are considered for production. In other words, when an agency intends to initiate the production of a paper on a particular aspect of Communism, its analysts should consult the card file to find out what has already been produced in this field, or what is in production, and then study the pertinent papers to avoid repetition, duplication, and waste of research invested in such studies.

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In looking through the project cards, both the Secretary and  a member of the Sub-Committee, while realizing that their inferences were necessarily superficial, came to the following tentative conclusions:

1. The field most thoroughly covered appears to be that of national Communist parties; but the variety of approach requires more systematic coordination as suggested under III-A of the Sub-Committee Report.
2. A great number of studies are political documents which are treating Communism as a marginal rather than a principal problem.
3. There has been little over-all coordination and, in consequence, much over-lapping and duplication exists in such prominent fields as, for example, Communism in China.
4. There appears to be no methodical coverage, but rather an impression of isolated projects, undertaken whenever or wherever they were requested and, in this connection, few attempts were made, with the exception of such documents as the Department of State's "Potentials of World Communism", to blend the varied aspects of Communism into an integrated whole. Instead, most studies deal with special problems.
5. Basically, to sum up, the entire field of intelligence on Communism appears to be in great need of methodical investigation, comprehensiveness, and coordination along the lines suggested in the Sub-Committee Report of 5 January 1950. There are comparatively few documents available which fill the needs of national intelligence in this field and most of those are individual projects, un-coordinated with respect to substantive as well as to administrative aspects.

That is what we found out on the canvass. If the members of the Committee wish to have a copy of the Table of Titles, they are here.

(Mr. London passed out copies of Table of Titles.)

NEMZER: We might say, for purposes of the report, and the record, that those of us who were on the Sub-Committee with Mr. London felt that there should be no conclusions come out of this canvass. I think his summary is an

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admirable one. Our position, I think, is pretty much as he has already stated it -- that the man power is not available to do a really good study, an adequate study, and that in the absence of an adequate study of the available material we cannot make any real guesses as to the gaps that exist. I might say that I agree largely with his conclusions -- his 'hunches', I might say. I would be inclined to have those same hunches whether we made that study or not. We do feel that there ought not to be any action taken in the future as a result of the canvass. The canvass added to our knowledge and gave us a list of available materials, and that is about all.

BABBITT: I might state that the results of the canvass, unsatisfactory as they are, certainly confirmed my opinion of the disorganized state of research in this field, and shows the very great need of just such a committee as this one.

Certainly, in the present state of the man power (which I see no immediate hope anyway of improving) it would be a very great mistake to rely on the card file or the list of titles in any way, except as an additional check, as Mr. London has suggested, before undertaking a project. That is one place to look.

NEMZER: I thoroughly agree.

BABBITT: I am going to try to remedy the lack of titles and projects undertaken by the external research program. I see no reason why we should not have adequate lists and descriptions of the projects in the card file. Those are certainly available in the external research program files. I think we can get them. That will help a great deal anyway. Similarly, I see no reason why the Rand projects should not be available to us in proper form.

There again, I should like to ask all of you to keep in mind the fact that that request of the Secretary was intended to be a continuing request. Since I cannot believe that no work on the general subject of International Communism has been done in any Intelligence agency since last November 15th,

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when I believe the last cards came in, may I ask you to go back to your respective agencies and look again?

In the future, it would enormously increase the value of the card catalogue if adequate descriptions of the papers produced, in production and planned were given with the title. If brief abstracts of the papers already produced could be made, I think it would be a great help, and also outlines of those scheduled for production and planned, if possible. I realize that some of them would have to be treated rather summarily, and in the lines of a description rather than an abstract or outline, but in some way to indicate the scope and nature of the paper.

NEMZER: In making this request, I wonder if Mr. London has not placed a responsibility on his own shoulders? If he is going to get the lists of the publications that are being produced, he ought to get those lists out. If any of us do, and I hope all of us do get in our individual lists, then we should like back from him some collective list on some kind of a periodical basis.

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That can be done.

BABBITT: That is an absolutely possible, and I think reasonable request.

What period do you suggest? Is it worth getting out every month?

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I don't think so. I would say quarterly.

NEMZER: That sounds logical.

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


I can do it every second month, but I think quarterly might be better.

BABBITT: In view of the small volume which we have, I think probably the quarterly production of such a list would be adequate for the time being, if that is satisfactory to all the members.

The Secretary will then consider himself instructed by the Committee to issue quarterly lists.

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Fine.

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In the interests of classifying these projects, I wonder if it might be well for the abstractors, those who abstract the studies that are

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being made, to bear in mind the outline (whatever plan we may sanction), watch the headings of the outline in making the abstract.

BABBITT: That is a practical suggestion, and one which leads quite naturally to the next point on the agenda.

I didn't mean to cut off any further discussion on the canvass. Is there any further discussion?

The main business of the meeting is the consideration of the report of the Sub-Committee which was sent out to you with the notice of this meeting. Before asking for comments, or any discussion on that, I should like to make an explanatory statement in regard to the last part of Paragraph 2, on page 1 -- particularly the last sentence. The "special committee" referred to there will be appointed (if this report is accepted) to develop a coordinated program of "intelligence production" -- "intelligence production", in the last sentence, should really be, "the production of a program", because obviously the Sub-Committee would be in no position to go into intelligence production as such, but rather to produce a program.

It is contemplated that this Sub-Committee, after arriving at a program in any one of the "fields of investigation", will submit it to this committee. The members of this committee will refer it to their respective organizations, and in consultation with the Sub-Committee, and after full consideration between them, and the adoption of any suggested modifications, will enable the Sub-Committee to present to this committee a coordinated program of intelligence production which will include the requirements of all the member organizations and agencies, and enable them to adjust their departmental production program to the over-all program of this committee.

That, in general, is the thought behind the recommendations of the Sub-Committee. With that further explanation, which I hope has clarified rather than confused the issue, I should be very glad to hear any discussion of the Report.

Then the outline, or framework as it is called, and the suggested divisions into fields of investigation, which are the four in the outline before you, I gather is satisfactory. Is there any comment on the report of the Sub-Committee?

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If not, we can consider it approved by this committee.

WITSON: One thing I wanted to make clear, on the allocation of research projects, was that in the FBI our research is done primarily to assist us in our investigations, and also to pass on the results of those investigations as they become available to the other intelligence agencies. From that point of view, our research might not necessarily fall within any pre-arranged framework that might come up.

BABBITT: Yes. The position of the FBI is somewhat different — in fact, very considerably different from that of the other agencies represented here. I believe that the original charter of the JIGSAW Committee adequately brings that out and would safeguard your interests.

DE LOACH: I think you are correct.

BABBITT: In this line and in all others.

DE LOACH: Our purpose, as stated in the original charter, was to coordinate our responsibilities and jurisdiction in the domestic field with your responsibilities and jurisdiction in the foreign field.

BABBITT: The future elaboration of these outlines into actual programs, and eventually into specific projects should, I think, be of some advantage to you. (Remark addressed to FBI representatives.)

WITSON: So that we can see what is being considered by other agencies.

BABBITT: Anything you do in the way of research and analysis in your field which would be of use in ours and which you could make available to us would, of course, be of considerable assistance. You will be kept informed of the development of these programs.

WITSON: As you get out the quarterly supplements.

BABBITT: Not only that but the field of investigation and the projects.

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[ ] Our position is somewhat similar to the position of the FBI. Our research is strictly operational, so the question of allocation would be considered in that context.

NEMZER: I think the point might be made for the committee as a whole that this particular matter is not restricted to the two agencies, but that all of us will have operational duties and any program made cannot affect these. In State we will have a great many things that need to be done for particular

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people because of particular situations that have arisen. It will be in supplementing, not in substitution that we will try to do this kind of work.

BABBITT: I think that is true of all of the agencies represented here. No program which is eventually arrived at by this committee must be regarded in any way as taking up all the production capabilities of any agency. It must be extremely flexible, because even in CIA we sometimes have rather sudden high priority requirements which might conceivably interfere with scheduled production.

I think it is a guide. Its eventual probable advantage will be that each of us will know what the other is interested in at the moment, what we are engaged in producing, along what lines their interest is running, and therefore we will know that a given matter is taken care of or about to be taken care of. We can, as the pressure of time changes the allocations, but our own efforts to something else.

I think the next step, now that the report of the Sub-Committee is accepted, is to implement the recommendations of the Sub-Committee, that a future sub-Committee should be appointed for the purpose of developing the program. It seems to me that the two agencies most directly concerned in the entire question of intelligence production on international Communism are OIR and ORE, (I wish in many ways that that were not so, but it does seem to be the case) and that therefore the logical method of procedure at this point is to continue the present Sub-Committee as the working committee for the further elaboration of the production program. If I am wrong in my impressions that that is the case, I would be most happy to hear from the other agencies.

NEWZER: As we are presently operating, the Sub-Committee has two representatives of CIA and two of State (four of us who are presently here), and we should like very much to have representation from the other agencies. Perhaps on an interim or special basis, where particular questions are being discussed by the Sub-Committee, perhaps the other agencies would be willing to send representatives to join in the discussion. Unless, of course, as Mr. Babbitt is now indicating, one of the other agencies is

willing to give us as a regular representative, somebody on the committee to work with us.

WILLIAMS: If I had some indication of the frequency of these meetings and the demand, perhaps I would be in a position to indicate a commitment. Maybe you could give me that.

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[ ]: It is very hard to determine.

BABBITT: It is extremely hard. The only thing I can see is that it is a fairly continuous process for some time. Certainly the problems involved in the elaborating this rather brief outline to the point of definite project allocations is going to be one which will, I am afraid, take some considerable man power.

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[ ]: The dates of the meetings will have to be very flexible, so that the members of the sub-committee can get together all of the time. We would have to be in telephone touch with you.

BABBITT: Could we take a tentative assignment and see how it works out?

WILLIAMS: I think so. I think we could do it on that basis. We will have an Air member, and try to preserve the continuity of that by having it either Colonel Wackwitz or myself.

BABBITT: You would be most welcome.

ABBOTT: I think the Navy would be very happy to be put in the position of being a consultant on perhaps a small and special phase of the problem. Unfortunately, our own research facilities are so extremely limited at this point that I fear it would be impractical to have a Navy member as a regular member of the Sub-Committee.

BABBITT: Remember that it is certainly not the intention to keep this entirely within the ORE-OIR circle, but rather that the working committee will probably be mostly that, and that, as I said before, as soon as the program in any one of these fields is even roughly blocked out it will most certainly be brought to all of the agencies concerned for their comments, additions and modifications.

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[ ]: Would it be feasible to decide first, in either this committee or the sub-committee, on the first step or the first general field of investigation they would go into, and then at that time notify the other members

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that they are going to sit in committee and lay out that field, so that if any of the members have a particular interest in those subjects they might assign someone because of that particular topic?

BABBITT: I don't know whether that would be feasible or not. It might well be. In any case, I see no reason why a continuing invitation to take part in the work of the Sub-Committee cannot be considered to exist.

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[ ] I thought that some might be particularly interested in certain topics and whenever they should come up in the series of programs laid out, they might be especially keen on having somebody there to help out.

BABBITT: The only difficulty with that, from the point of view of the working committee would be a break in the continuity of the background and consequently a waste of time in bringing a man up on what had gone on in the last three or four meetings of the committee, which is not a small point.

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[ ] We all agree, I think, and realize that.

BOYNTON: (Remark addressed 25X1A [ ]) Will you take that up with Major Carlan?

NEWMER: As I understand it, the next step is to determine which of the four major subdivisions of this outline we are to select as our test run. Perhaps, II, "International Communist Organization and Activity". Then have the Sub-Committee present for consideration by the JIGSAW and by the agencies an actual list of projects which, in their estimation, should be done for the benefit of the US government within the foreseeable future -- a series of definite projects feasible within the facilities available to us and not yet done, and needed in terms of what we know.

That would be a very considerable job, I think, in terms of JIGSAW. I might say, in terms of the interim group, which I represent to some extent, that it would be a step forward from what we have been doing for a considerable time. It would be a considerable step forward in terms of our discussions over a period of two years now.

BABBITT: Would it be advantageous to pick III, "National Communist Parties, and Counter Activity" -- for the simple reason that at least the

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tentative conclusions (I hate to call them conclusions) from the present list of titles would seem to indicate that more work has been done in that field, and that therefore you might have a more concrete basis on which to work?

Moreover, it also presents a problem which I think should be faced sooner or later -- that of developing an outline for the study of national Communist parties which could be applied to all national Communist parties. Would not that be very advantageous?

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[ ] From the point of view of OSO, I heartily agree with you.

What we are most in need of are scientific and searching studies of national Communist parties, country by country, according to priority of schedule. I quite agree with the conclusions of the Secretary. I have been looking for adequate studies on the CP-Italy, the CP-France, or the CP-China, and I don't think there is anything adequate in our files in any agency. I am sorry to state it so frankly, but I think it is a fact.

BABBITT: Unfortunately, it may still be true that more has been done in that field.

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[ ] More done, but not in the thoroughness that it needs to be done.

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[ ] From the point of view of OSO, I would support your suggestion.

I definitely think that a good outline is very badly needed, and OSO is interested.

NEMZER: I am not sure that I agree with you. It seems to me that at this stage of the game the drawing up of an outline for studies to be done would tend to be quite artificial -- a formal making rigid of some guesses about the parties. It seems to me that the studies themselves that might be done among any one of a long series of possibilities. If we were to draw up a theoretical outline of the way we think it ought to be done, I am not sure that we would be making much advance. First of all, I am not sure that the analysts would use the outlines; and, second, I am not sure that the outlines would have any great effectiveness as such.

It seems to me, at best, that the Sub-Committee would merely draw up a list of Communist parties of the world and put them in terms of some priority

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as far as the desirability of reports is concerned, and I think that might not be as helpful as attempting an area where there is very little work being done of any consequence. I would say, perhaps, II (International Communist Organisation and Activity), where, in some ways, an effort to fill the very important gap of information on the international organizations might make more intelligible any effort to fill the gap on the national parties as such.

WILLIAMS: Actually they are indivisible, are they not? At least the division is purely for the handling of material, rather than to furnish any structural separation.

The thought that occurs to me is -- I need the answer to this question from what material? From what basic material is it contemplated, for example, that the studies in III would be developed? Would the development of the material by this committee be based on material developed elsewhere? Would there be an effort to develop basic material where none presently exists? Just what sources would be drawn on? I happen to know, for example, of the existence of a new study that got into my hands yesterday on the Communist Party in Hungary from 1919 to 1949. There is one in preparation of the Communist Party in Greece from roughly the same period. It is field work in the case of Greece, and research focussed at a university in the Hungarian case. I think that is almost a basic problem. Where do we start? Do we have to build a foundation, or are we going to use these products, or is it a combination of both?

BABBITT: I think it would be a combination. Certainly we have no idea of duplicating, in the sense of doing over a foundation that has been adequately done. The idea, of course, is to determine for what purposes a given paper or book is adequate.

NEMZER: It seems to me, in terms of the situation we have now, there are a series of reports being written, or contemplated, in government and by people we would have no control over, or even influence. The Hungarian study would obviously be done whether we wanted it or not, and done along

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the lines that would have nothing to do with us. The Greek study we might influence to a certain extent, but not a great deal, I guess. If we were to spend a great deal of time in enumerating the studies we would like done, and the various types of studies, and to what end, the studies would be done anyway by people over whom we would have little influence. On the other hand, if we would point to an area in which there was little done, and pick out these very important gaps, and indicate that somewhere along the line that we ourselves in the American government want this gap filled for very logical reasons, we might be able to focus sufficient attention to get those gaps filled and to influence the way in which it is being filled.

WILLIAMS: I question the influencing of the way in which it is done.

It seems to me that the health of any product of an intellectual task force, which is essentially which would produce any one of those basic studies, is insured by as liberal terms of reference as possible. I would hate to feel that a blue-print was being supplied by the committee for the production of basic material. I think there may be certain criteria used in transforming that basic material into a finished product of the committee, but I think anything else would be a serious impairment of the process of production.

NEMZER: I am heartily in agreement with that point of view.

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The term 'rigid' has been used several times, as if the intention had been to produce some sort of a rigid outline. So far as I know, that was not in the mind of any of those who discussed it or formulated this statement. The only thing -- and the thing on which I wish this group might render an opinion -- is that studies might be made, through the committee using all sorts of material of other investigators, of course, where features that are in common in different parties in different parts of the world (and we know many of them) could be noted and therefore they could be made the basis of what is stated under III, B, type studies and comparative summaries. The only way to find things that are in common is to either go over the studies that have been made to find those things in common for your type studies, or else make an outline which would indicate things that you find as a result of canvassing a large number of studies already made. Things that

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you would be likely to find, and things which have proved significant. From my own study of the individual party of one country, I am quite convinced that there are quite a number of things that are not merely in that country but in a number of other countries. In fact, I have made comparative studies, to a certain degree. By the same token, those things in which the party was unique or individual would be very, very important. So I think an outline would be useful — not because it compels people to hold to a certain rigid number of, say, a hundred items, but because it would provide quite a number of items which might be overlooked, in some cases, because they were unique. They might be overlooked because they were common. It is not a matter of rigidity; it is a matter of assistance and of conclusiveness.

BABBITT: Certainly I think that no outline which was so rigid as to pre-judge what the outcome of the study was going to be, and shape it beforehand, would be of value. But it also seems to me that it is possible to draw up a list of factors — maybe that is just another way of saying 'outline' — which have been of importance in studies already made, and what we know about the parties, and which therefore could be expected to cast some light on the organization and workings of another party either by their presence or by their absence.

WILLIAMS: I find myself confused between the discussion of the gentleman on my right and between the two sections: Paragraph III, B. and Paragraph I, "Principles of Communism." Because after all what we are studying is the rigid degenerated dynamic system, and what is to be done in Paragraph I is to be duplicated in III, B., if I am not mistaken, because the criteria to be established in I, "Principles of Communism", and the breakdown would seem to be the same principles that would be enumerated in the "Type studies and comparative summaries." I don't understand your understanding of this system. Is it a flow from a center downward? You can work both ways — from the center downward, and from the extremities toward the center, which I take it is the method you are going into in Paragraph III, B., abstract conclusions drawn from details, and those are the abstractions that are developed in Paragraph I.

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RABBITT: There is nothing abstract about III, B. It is the definite organization, the definite clandestine organization and activity.

WILLIAMS: Paragraph I, A., (b), Communist organization -- it is exactly the same thing.

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[ ] These are the principles.

RABBITT: How does it work out?

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[ ] Communist organization as part of a theory, as we see it, under I, A; implementation of this theory in national parties would then be III, B.

WILLIAMS: I think that clarifies my confusion.

RABBITT: One is theory and one is practice. Under III, B., you would consider how it has worked out in this particular country, as: Are the people Moscow trained? All kinds of perfectly practical details that you would want to know.

NEEMER: Under the theory you might discuss material that would be found in Lenin's works on what is to be done; whereas in your type studies you might analyze the various kinds of headquarters that are used by the Communist parties in a number of areas.

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[ ] Although I came in on that committee late, I understand that I, A., the discussion of the theory, would be made in connection with the history of the Communist theory -- the principles as you had them from leading Communist authorities.

WILLIAMS: I was probably confused by "The organization of national Communist parties". It should read, "The organization of a national Communist party". The study of one party at a time as a unique study, as against the whole picture.

RABBITT: We have perhaps gotten a little away from the immediate question-- not too far, but let us consider it again. The immediate question is, in which of these fields are we to start? In which of these fields is the sub-committee to initiate its work?

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[ ] Without any preference myself, I want to call two facts to the attention of the members. We might start building from above now. Or are we going to establish something very fundamental and build up on that fundamental

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basis? If we have urgent problems concerning international Communism, of course we go into II; if we think it might be worthwhile to build up something very fundamental, as for instance a library of national Communist parties, we might have to consider III first. It is a question of opinion.

NEMZER: I am not sure it is completely relevant to the terms of the situation. You have a current situation where parties are being studied in many places by many people. Whether or not you draw up a list there will be such studies made. Many have been made -- quite inadequate, but they have been made -- and they will continue to make them. The studies on national parties will be made, as such. On the other hand, it seems to me there are very serious gaps on which nothing is being done -- largely in terms of the international aspects of what is, of course, primarily an international movement.

In terms of the end result of the Sub-Committee's work, I should visualize if we take III, primarily a listing of the names of the Communist parties in terms of some priority -- perhaps the discussion of whether we should have Yugoslavia first, or Hungary first, or something of that sort. Little more than that, I think, can be done there.

In terms of II (I might say I was not prepared for this discussion), I would visualize the situation where we would look over the available materials and find quite readily places where gaps do exist. 'What are the connections between the Communist parties at this time?' 'What is the situation of the Cominform in the world organization?' 'How do orders go from headquarters to the national parties?' To my knowledge, no studies are being done along those lines at this time.

ABBOTT: I would like to agree with you that that is an extremely important phase of the problem, and I think you are certainly in a position to speak authoritatively on the subject, since you have produced so many of the extant studies in this Section II, particularly the large one on 'International Front Organizations'. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me,

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I would like to cite as an example of a very small analysis which is being undertaken at the present time which has a bearing on this problem. That is, 'The Utilization of International Communism of the CINC', the Greek Maritime Federation, which crosscuts not only the entire Mediterranean but also large parts of northern and western Europe and the United States as well. It comprises, we believe, a very important subversive threat against the United States.

ABBOTT: That is in preparation isn't it?

ABBOTT: It is something which my shop is doing on a very, very small scale with the materials at hand which we received from your organization and from State.

NEWMAN: It not only would be useful in a general sense, but it is a type of **pioneering** study. We in the government have done almost nothing in that field; whereas in almost any case you can find studies of almost any national party.

ABBOTT: In addition to that, of course, CIA itself is producing many papers on the national parties. I cite you "The Communist Party of Burma" and the "Communist Party of Italy", which I believe recently has been submitted to the other agencies for consideration.

NEWMAN: Also on Scandinavia.

25X1A

It is too bad we cannot have a couple of committees operating.

25X1A

The view of OSO on its operational needs is that if you want better intelligence and better information, which we are supposed to procure, you have to provide us with the necessary collation of material. Political analysis, over-all assessments of policies, and so on, are quite useful, very well done at times, but our needs call for a much more detailed research approach. Therefore, I suggest that III be tackled first, but again for selfish reasons.

ABBOTT: I think undoubtedly each one of us has his concrete problems in this field which require definite, concrete answers. At the same time, the argument that that type of paper is being produced, and will continue to

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be produced, more or less on an ad hoc basis, has a great deal of cogency. That there is a greater gap in the field represented by II than in that represented by III seems to be undeniable; but again the question is: Which do we really need at the moment?

25X1A

[ ] May I say one more thing -- that a great deal more material is being produced in that field, but if at the same time it does not meet the needs of those who are working directly in that field, would not it mean that a small amount of work on that subject might produce far more results in a much shorter time, by making the kind of outline to fit the needs that have been mentioned?

NEWMER: I think there is a difference of opinion as to the function of the Sub-Committee. It seems to me if the Sub-Committee is to establish only a suggested list of priorities of subjects to be treated, you have one concept. If you are thinking of the Sub-Committee as establishing a qualitative measurement for the kind of studies that are going to be turned out anyway, it seems to me you have another committee in mind. If we are going to ask our Sub-Committee not merely to draw up lists of titles of studies that ought to be done, but to draw up a means of measuring what will be done in the future -- you have two different concepts there. I really, in my own mind, don't see that the Sub-Committee, in the terms we have been working here, would really be serving its function if it applied itself to the problem of setting qualitative standards.

25X1A

[ ] Probably there might be a difference of opinion there as to your use of the term 'setting qualitative standards'. To lay out the topics on which material would be gathered for the national parties -- you are merely programming to a more detailed degree there than you are in the other topics. In other words, it is not a matter of evaluating any more than you evaluate by saying, 'we will lay out the details of a program', and then say that there should be five or six different projects under that. You do the same thing if you lay out the plan for a party study, and you have perhaps fifteen or twenty items there. It is not a matter of evaluation. It is the same process, as I see it, in going into more detail than the actual kind of thing to be gathered.

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NEMZER: I am not really clear on that now. You draw up a list and on the list you have Number One, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This committee, JIGSAT, has come to the conclusion that right at the top of the list of priorities of national parties to be studied is the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and we therefore ask that one of the agencies in town accept that as an assignment, or carry it out in its normal program; but in addition to seeing that that particular subject is covered, we are going into the subject of how it should be covered, and indicate to whatever agency accepts that assignment that these various things shall be treated to some extent and in those various ways. I don't really think that we can do such a thing. I don't think that any agency would accept an assignment in those terms. I do feel that that would become a kind of a rigid framework into which we are expecting intelligence researchers to fit their material. I don't think that fits our own concept of our committee here.

25X1A

All of us in this field have a fair idea of how, let's say, the study of a national party should be conducted -- what elements should be investigated, what elements should be given emphasis, and what elements can be neglected. But to my mind, a listing of elements of approaches would be of help to the agencies charged with the project. For instance, I have made the observation that very many analysts do not dig under the surface of the party. They are satisfied with what they read in the newspapers, and an occasional SO report, which may be good or bad -- I don't know. They are satisfied with the surface assessment of the party and do not consider such things as the organizational problems of the cadre, the composition of the cadre, the education of the cadre, the problem of the rejuvenation of the party, the problems of the secret communications of the party, the clandestine activities of the party itself. That could be worked out in general terms as a guide for the agency involved. That is all I had in mind.

NEMZER: That is not part of the problem of drawing up a list of priorities. I do agree that that is a project JIGSAT might undertake. We might indicate from our collective experience the kind of materials that ought to be considered in drawing up studies; but it seems to me that that is quite different

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from the sort of thing we have in front of us -- primarily drawing up an overall program of priority lists.

BABBITT: Is not it just a little farther down on the program?

25X1A

[ ] You select five parties, five countries, and you spell out the method, the approach to the research project in general terms. That is not too rigid, and should be compiled in such a fashion as to alert the analyst to the problems involved -- nothing else.

WILLIAMS: It is really research guidance, which is a compilation of all of the known factors which would be helpful in any given research situation. I think it would be excellent guidance and one that would expedite the whole process.

NEMZER: I think it would be a splendid project for JIGSAW. I am not sure this is the time for such a project.

25X1A

[ ] That depends on what we are going to tackle. If we are going to take III, we will have to get this thing straight. If we take II first, it can wait.

NEMZER: That is right.

BABBITT: That is our question. Which do we tackle first? Quite obviously Mr. Nemzer prefers II, and Mr. [ ] prefers III. It seems to me we have to select. 25X1A

WILLIAMS: I could indicate no choice whatsoever. The requirements in both fields, I think, are balanced.

BOYNTON: I could give no preference at this time.

ABBOTT: Number II, I think.

WRIGHT: I have no preference. I would be inclined to say Number II.

WITSON: No preference.

BABBITT: I would say that Number II had a slight edge as far as the voting went.

WILLIAMS: It just occurs to me that the beginning is a good place to start.

BABBITT: That is almost shocking in its impact! In other words, you are casting a vote for Number I.

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WILLIAMS: I could not indicate a logical preference between II and III for that reason. Because it seems to me that the work done by the committee in field I would be of such value in either field, II or III, that it could not be overlooked as a beginning point.

25X1A

[ ] We thought of a possibility of farming out most of Number I.

MORRIS: We still have to do it.

25X1A

[ ] That is another way of speeding things up.

[ ] I wonder whether it would be possible for the committee to work out something rather quickly, which I think could be done rather quickly, on Number I. Farming it out, and then go to either II or III -- whichever the committee decides.

BABBITT: By farming it out you mean through the external research or Rand. A great deal of it, of course, exists in print in the Library of Congress.

NEIZER: The British have turned out a booklet of about 150 pages which touches on this. I am not sure that it might be considered pressing to get an addition to the already large lists of publications in the field.

BABBITT: It seems to me, in fact, that Number I is more a question of collation.

WITSON: Determining what is actually lacking.

BABBITT: Certainly it is more of a survey job, I would say.

25X1A

[ ] I think it could be stated very quickly what is lacking under Number I. I think it is an analysis of Communist strategy and tactics in specific terms as determined by the Comintern and applied by the national parties from 1919 to 1949. That does not exist, and that is, to my mind, a study that should not be farmed out, but should be written by those people who have investigated the Communist patterns.

NEIZER: I am not sure whether you are not talking about Number II. I would say it would be Number II. Number I would be largely the theories.

25X1A

[ ] In terms of projects -- not Number I. Secondly, there is lacking an up to date analysis of the methods of international coordination and co-operation between the CPSU and the national parties among the national parties themselves. OSO put out an interim study on that subject, but that study is not adequate and certainly should be rewritten and investigated in full.

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25X1A



In other words, we have abandoned Number I.

I was speaking not within the framework of this outline, but I was pointing out the studies I think ought to be done urgently — right now.

NEMZER: You are agreeing with the way the majority voted.


25X1A



From the point of view of OSC, if you wish to improve the intelligence procurement, which might affect you one way or the other, I consider that several studies on key parties should be undertaken, so this is, in my opinion, an urgent problem. That is lacking. We have no complete and thorough studies of key parties in the world. We have no complete studies of methods and practices of international control and coordination. And we have no concrete analysis of strategy and tactics employed by the international movements since 1919.

BABBITT: Those are under Number II.

25X1A



That would go into both II and III.

I mean a factual analysis of the presentation of strategy.


Would it then perhaps be accurate for the JIGSAW committee to find out what elements of Number II and Number III should be undertaken? Perhaps it would not be too good an idea to limit one's self to one field of investigation, because it is an entirely new aspect of the matter, but apparently there are some requirements for both.

BABBITT: There is, most certainly. There are requirements in all four.


WILLIAMS: There is a pressing requirement in II (d).

NEMZER: I would find it strange if you would close your eyes and put your finger anywhere and not find it was a pressing requirement.

25X1A

BABBITT: I quite agree. But which one shall the Sub-Committee start in on? , how long do you think it would take the Sub-Committee to find out the gaps in Number I, with a view to farming out most of it?


25X1A



That is hard to say. We would have to make a study of what has been written.

25X1A

BABBITT: That is a job — starting with the Library of Congress.



I mean things written particularly for the US Government.

BABBITT: On the theory, much of this has been written not for the US Government. I think you said it would not be too difficult to work that one

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up. I am not so sure, but you are on the Sub-Committee.

25X1A

[ ] I think we could find out in the Sub-Committee to what particular subject we have to limit ourselves.

NEUZER: You would have to start out by deciding what is meant by 'adequate' and then apply the standard to all of the material available. Take the works on Communist doctrine and determine whether there are gaps that have not been dealt with adequately by the available material. I cannot see it done in anything less than two years.

BABBITT: You would not say two weeks, would you?

25X1A

[ ] No. Don't you think we might come to some tentative conclusions after a couple of months?

NEUZER: The word 'doctrine' is a tremendous word, and the word 'organization', and the various things we would have to consider in taking those two words, breaking it down into meaningful subdivisions and then applying them to the available bibliography. I think the bibliography would be a tremendous job.

BABBITT: There is no question but that work on that type, on the principles of Communism and the theory of Communism, would be extremely valuable to all of us and to many other people in the government. At the same time, it seems to me that we could better serve the government by beginning our work in a more concrete field, such as that represented by Number II or Number III. Or even Number IV, which nobody seems to be concerned about at the moment.

I suggest then, that in view of the discussion, the committee be instructed to present a program in such detail as they are able to arrive at on Number II, 'International Communist Organization and Activity'. It seems to me, on a balance, from the discussion today that that is the desire of the majority of those present. Is there any discussion?

25X1A

[ ] Would there be any possibility of working out at least a very brief and short provisional program for [ ] needs?

25X1A

[ ] I think you either establish a priority or you don't. If you want to agree on Number II, it would be advisable to agree on II and go ahead.

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BABBITT: I don't know that we are all agreed, but obviously you have got to start somewhere.

25X1A

[ ] Apparently, I had a misconception with regard to what was supposed to be a field of investigation for further programming. I had in mind the subdivisions under a topic like II, rather than II as a whole. In other words, if we say that II (b), II (c), or II (f) is of more immediate urgency than others, then that would be outlined in detail as a field of investigation.

BABBITT: I certainly have been using the terms in a much broader sense.

NEZZER: I would agree with you.

25X1A

[ ] That is my understanding.

[ ] In considering II, would it not be unavoidable to consider IV also, which states, 'Communism as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy'?

BABBITT: Under IV, it says:

"Based on continuous coordination of relevant material from studies from I, II, and III above, of separate study of Soviet foreign policy, and of other special studies. To include for the time being, but not to be confined to:"

It would be very difficult to keep them separate, whether the committee wanted them to or not. I think they would find themselves considering that. I think that is quite true.

It strikes me that IV is on a lower level of detail than the others. This is a passing observation. Take (b), 'The participation of Soviet embassies and missions in its promotion, direction, and utilization of Communism', as compared to 'Communist penetration of strategic industries.' (II (c) (1))

ABBOTT: It is tied in with that, as well as the espionage and sabotage topic.

25X1A

[ ] Originally there were cross references to these, but they were eliminated in the outline.

BABBITT: There is no reason why the committee could not restore them.

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25X1A

[ ] I would suggest in drawing up a program that the Sub-Committee should consider IV (a):

"USSR's promotion, direction and utilization of national and international Communist and non-Communist organizations and activities for the furtherance of its political and economic aims."

25X1A

DE LOACH: I think we should stand and give a vote of confidence to Dr. [ ] of the Sub-Committee.

BABBITT: Could the Sub-Committee make a survey of II and report back to this committee, say in two weeks, in a very general block outline, and in the nature of a progress report and program? I suggest that with the thought that possibly such a report might further clarify some of the questions which have been raised this afternoon and indicate whether or not we really are on the right track.

NEMZER: The Sub-Committee might present a report saying 'we are thinking along these lines', without selecting any priority, or without saying that we have a complete list of projects that need to be done we suggest that we may draw up a list and perhaps give ten projects that seemed to be feasible to us.

BABBITT: I should like very much to get down to something rather more concrete than has been produced either by the interim or this committee so far. That is what I had in mind, and we seem always to run into — perhaps it is inescapable — these questions of principle which keep us from getting down to the production of intelligence on International Communism, which, after all, is the main idea of the committee.

25X1A

[ ] I think most of the principles have been ironed out now. I think we can proceed without too many difficulties, I would think. But two weeks is very little time — particularly for me. I have to finish up the Army paper. Can we make it three weeks?

BABBITT: If three weeks is the minimum, it will have to be three weeks.

NEMZER: The agreement would be that it would be a progress report.

BABBITT: What the ground looks like when some of the underbrush has been hacked away. I would like to get a look at what the rocks look like. It is

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most unfortunate that none of the members of the Sub-Committee, or most of us, can put the major part of our time on this work.

25X1A [ ] If this is going to be regarded as four fields of investigation - each one with a Roman numeral - it would seem to simplify the apportioning of the work, but I do remain appalled at the prospect of taking that entire field of 'International Communist Organization and Activity' and outlining it in detail within a couple of weeks time.

25X1A [ ] We are not going to do it in detail.

Giving enough detail to show where the rocks are.

BABBITT: It has got to be faced some time.

25X1A [ ] It is just a matter of time.

NEUZER: It is not an outline of the entire field, not an effort to accomplish all of the potential in that. It is an effort to state specifically, keeping in mind the availability to this government, which projects might be done within the foreseeable future that might be useful.

25X1A [ ] If we can do a selective job, on the basis of urgency, and on the basis of what may be necessary in general - if we take some particular points in International Organizations and then proceed on the basis of urgency of a certain aspect of it - all right. Doing it as a very selective mode of procedure.

BABBITT: Would it be more practicable, and get us down to the ground level more quickly and surely, to assign to the Sub-Committee one of these sub-headings - for instance II (a), or whatever, and do three weeks worth of work on that and make a progress report? I am inclined to think 'No', but I would like to thresh that out.

NEUZER: I would prefer the relative freedom of II, in that case.

25X1A [ ] I am outvoted. I will be glad to sit in on it.

BABBITT: Let's see how we come out on that.

To sum up: The Sub-Committee, consisting of Messrs. Neuzer, Morris, 25X1A [ ], and an Air Force member --

WILLIAMS: On a tentative basis.

25X1A [ ] As far as Army is concerned, we will hear from ID on that matter.

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DOZMON: We will call as soon as we make a decision.

25X1A

Now that we have adopted Number II as the first topic, if there should be any interest in that and anyone would care to join us or send in suggestions or anything of that sort, would that be pertinent?

BABBITT: Not only pertinent but highly desirable.

ABBOTT: I would be delighted to send suggestions. As a matter of fact, I did two years ago to our colleague across the table and as a result he produced four major tomes which have been particularly useful ever since.

BABBITT: The terms of reference, then, for the Sub-Committee are in general those set forth at the top of page 2 of the report of the formal sub-committee:

"To analyze the production problems substantively and procedurally, and draw up for each field of investigation, a specific program for consideration of the JIGSAW Committee. This program should include priorities, topics (with terms of reference), sub-allocations to participating agencies or research organizations, and scheduling as far as it can be foreseen."

In the case of Number II, a specific program for consideration of the JIGSAW Committee. A progress report will be made to the JIGSAW Committee, at a meeting to be held on Friday, February 24th, at 2:30, in this room, unless you are notified to the contrary.

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The meeting adjourned at 1600.

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